Listening to the tapes from a libertarian anti-war conference I co-sponsored in 1984 has sparked many thoughts and some insights; the passage of years allows me to listen with new ears and to make new integrations.

I can now articulate one of the reasons why the so-called libertarian defense of war bothers me on a fundamental level. The defense reduces to the following argument: because an individual has a right to use deadly force in self-defense, a state (which can be defined as a collection of individuals) has the collective right to defend itself through war. Only one of the things wrong with the argument is that it equates states or nations with individuals as though a nation’s “rights” are identical to those possessed by an individual.

Before addressing the basic objection around which my thoughts have been revolving, I should note a tension in the political worldview of so-called libertarians who defend war as an act of self-defense. Overwhelmingly, these advocates champion a state that is far larger than the “night watchman” one envisioned by Rand or the truly minimal-government advanced by minarchist libertarians. This makes sense. As a purely practical matter, a truly minimal government cannot launch or sustain the wars these advocates wish to justify; war requires the ability to demand goods and services through procedures like taxation. If a state or nation has identical (and no more) rights than an individual, then the demand for goods and services cannot be justified and war cannot be waged. Using taxation as an example, if is wrong for an individual to use force to demand money from others (to steal) then it is – by hawk-lib standards -- similarly wrong for a state to use force to tax; but the ability to steal is a prerequisite to modern war. Pro-war libertarians can’t have it both ways. If nations have the same rights as individuals, if war is justified on the basis of an individual’s right to self-defense, then the resources upon which war rests must also be eschewed on the basis of an individual’s right to retain their own property.

My objections to treating the so-called rights of a state as parallel to the rights of an individual are more fundamental, however, than merely pointing out a double standard. As I find time today, I will try to enunciate clearly one of the objections that I've been turning over and over in my mind.